John McMurray

Just this week a summary report of the most recent Summer Flounder Stock Assessment Workshop was released. It’s a difficult read for a civilian but it looks as if the only real change is an increase in the natural mortality estimate (the number of fish that die from natural causes). It follows to reason that this drives a significant drop in the long term number of fish that could be achieved under a management plan. Still with me? Yeah, it’s boring and sometimes confusing stuff, but important nonetheless.

So, if you’ve been following the summer flounder issue at all, you know that by law the fluke population has to reach a certain level (a scientifically determined rebuilding goal) by the year 2013. Reaching this goal was requiring some very significant cuts in landings and the commercial and recreational fishing industries weren’t very happy about that.

So now, with the natural mortality estimate significantly increased, the rebuilding goal is significantly reduced, thus, according to the new model we are closer to the rebuilding goal than we initially thought. The Jersey fishing press is screaming victory, saying they were right all along, but my interpretation is there isn’t much for those folks to celebrate about, and really they weren’t right at all. I’ll get to that in a second.

A long time industry supporter told the Asbury Park Press “We’ve been fishing under this system for all this time, and they suddenly sat down and used different numbers, What a hoax!” Well, let’s be honest here. It’s likely that the natural mortality number wouldn’t have changed if those industry reps didn’t secure one of their scientists a seat at the stock assessment table.

There are already a good number of folks who believe that the increase in the natural mortality variable was political. I spoke to one scientist today who said that natural mortality estimate is pretty darn high on the scale, and went on to describe it as “absurd”. I’m not sure I agree with such strong words, especially in light of all the supporting documentation that the higher mortality rate is indeed plausible. But, there has been a ton of political pressure on managers to increase harvest, so I can understand this view. According to insiders, NOAA wasn’t happy about the natural mortality tweak nor was it wholeheartedly endorsed by the review committee, but they didn’t think it was inappropriate, and saw no reason to reject the option. But indeed I have to say that it appears politics is playing a role in a system that is supposed to rely on un-bias science. With all this being said however, the option did pass a peer review. If NOAA Fisheries says this is the best available science, then we need to follow it, and I’ll wholeheartedly support it.

What is paramount in all of this is the integrity of the peer-review process. I spent the last couple of years supporting the prior rebuilding target of 197-million-pounds, and the resultant management measures, because they reflected the best available science, as represented by a peer-reviewed stock assessment. A faction of the recreational fishing industry and the commercial fishing industry attacked the science as “bad” without offering anything else in its place, and I opposed that approach because I believed it was wrong. Now, we’re looking at a significantly lowered target and folks are cheering, because they feel that their attack on the prior target of 197 million pounds was vindicated. Some folks on the other side of the spectrum are upset, because they feel that the 197 million pound target was improperly undercut. Both are overlooking the fact that the essential process remains the same, and that both the prior 197 million pound and the present 131 million pound targets reflect the best available science at the time the calculations were made.

We always have to remember that, if researchers are doing their jobs, every year brings additional data and additional knowledge. In 2011, we’ll have even more information, and can probably expect additional tuning of the reference points. Undoubtedly that’s a good thing, and it shows that indeed the system does work and that it is already sufficiently “flexible.” Thus, there is absolutely no need for a “Flexibility” Amendment to fisheries management law currently being pushed by some. Such an amendment is shortsighted and would essentially bring us back to the pre-1996 days of perpetual overfishing.

Now, back to the victory celebration columns. As mentioned, if natural mortality has been underestimated and the fishery is less productive than previously thought, that will lower the rebuilding goal. The bottom line is that, while the rebuilding target is lower, harvest is ultimately also lower than it would be under the old rules.

In other words, if the fishery is eventually declared fully rebuilt with the lower goal, we won’t see much looser regulations than what we have now, where as if the stock had been rebuilt to what scientists had said it could be rebuilt to under the old system, anglers could have enjoyed far more liberal size and bag limits had the initial rebuilding goal been met. Of course this begs the question, could that prior goal have been achieved if we had followed the plan and didn’t overfish every year. Guess we’ll never know.

Just getting in from what amounted to yet another good day of fishing in my neck of the woods. Without a doubt, this has been a good year so far and today was no exception. But to get back to the marina, I had to run the solemn course though the excessive crowd of boats. One would think that the high price of fuel would keep a good number of folks off the water these days, but right now there are a ton of boats using live menhaden (aka bunker) to catch large fecund striped bass just a mile or so off the beach. I won’t even acknowledge all those idiots that are poaching fish (and unfortunately there are quite a few), but the great majority of folks are releasing those fish they’ve caught above their “limit.”

Anyone who has ever done any live bait fishing knows that stripers, especially the big ones, inhale the bait. Thus, if you are using a J-hook, just about every fish gets it in the belly. That’s fine if you are planning on keeping your two fish and going home. Menhaden are big baits and rarely does a short eat one. But if you keep fishing after that, as most anglers do, THEN USE A DARN CIRCLEHOOK FOR GOD’S SAKE!

I’m not going to explain how circlehooks work as I believe most know already, and if you don’t you can find many a detailed explanation by Googleing it. In my experience, as well as just about everyone I know who uses them, they result in a perfect lip hooked fish 90% of the time. And it’s not just anecdotal. There is a ton of science out there that shows that circlehooks in bait fisheries dramatically reduce release mortality.

Yet despite all this, the overwhelming majority of anglers continue to use J-hooks! I went on a charter for a bachelor party two years ago and this dumbass Captain was using treble hooks to live-line bunker! I couldn’t believe it! Talk about lack of foresight.

Thus, this is the time of the year that I usually see a good number of dead bass floating on the surface on my way back to the marina each morning. And these are the ones that don’t skink. I’m sure there are a lot more. And when you multiply my small area by all those areas that have vibrant live and dead bait fisheries for striped bass, it really adds up. And it’s not just my dumb-ass saying it. It’s a fact. According to the most recent striped bass stock assessment, recreational discards account for 34% of the total catch! To put that into perspective, that’s double what the total commercial landing are! Kinda hard to justify gamefish with those numbers don’t ya think? Yet still, folks foolishly resist new hook technology that could dramatically reduce this number.

I’ve got to say, the fact that circlehooks aren’t required in those fisheries that are prone to excessive release mortality (fish that die as a result of angling related trauma) isn’t required by now angers me. Why the H wouldn’t we require them!? That’s a question I asked during the last ASMFC Striped Bass Advisory Panel meeting. All the panel had the nerve to muster up was to recommend increased “education” on circle hooks. Like that’s gonna do anything? There was the usual talk about agencies being unable to enforce such a regulation, yet if it was a law, for sure most folks would follow it. Then there was the knucklehead who said that his charter clients wouldn’t be able to figure out how to use the. Uhm, what!? All you do is come tight on the fish. What could be easier than that?

We really need circle hook regulations. It’s absurd not to have them. Until we reduce that release mortality percentage, we just don’t have any credibility.

Just a couple of weeks ago, NOAA Fisheries released a proposed rule on the National Saltwater Angler Registry that requires anglers to be “registered” before fishing in 2009. NOAA’s Fisheries Service is seeking comment on the proposed rule, which was a requirement of the reauthorized Magnuson-Stevens Act.

Because sates in the Northeast which don’t already have statewide saltwater license couldn’t get it together, the Federal Government has had to step in and do this. Here’s why: The recreational fishing data collection system (Marine Recreational Fishing Static Survey- MRFSS) sucks. Basically a bunch of contractors make cold-calls to random households to try and find people who fish. I mean come on! What are the odds they’ll find an angler? There is a dockside survey also, but there are a ton of problems with that as well. I’ve been fishing Jersey, NYC and Long Island Waters hard for about 15 years and I have never once been surveyed. There are simply not enough folks surveyed. And what about all those folks that fish estuaries or fish at night? Nope, they aren’t even in the picture. No survey exists for them. And let’s be honest. Lots of fishing mortality, particularly with bass, occurs at night. Quite simply, MRFSS is a terrible system and it’s not even designed to do what it has been tasked to do.

Here’s where the serious problem lies: When managers don’t have complete and accurate data it can and often does result in overly restrictive measures, or much worse, it can result in continued overfishing. In either case, we are the big losers. It is undeniable that with a licensing or registry-system, fishery management numbers would be greatly enhanced. “The national registry of saltwater anglers is the key to closing a major gap in information on recreational fishing,” said Jim Balsiger, NOAA acting assistant administrator for NOAA’s Fisheries Service. “It will help us conduct surveys to get a more complete picture of how recreational fishing by an estimated 14 million people is affecting fish stocks. This will lead to better stock assessments and more effective regulations to rebuild and manage these valuable fish.”

Now here’s what sucks about this National Angler Registry when you compare to a regular state license. While the registry will start out free in 2009, in 2001 anglers will be charged around $25. While a state license can and will be used for restoration and fishery management in the state, by law, the registry fee taken by NOAA is to be used solely to offset the cost of issuing the registration. It can not be specifically directed to fisheries management. And get this… The money wouldn’t even go to NOAA, but rather directly into the black hole of the U.S. Treasury!

At this point it’s just stupid for all those states in the Northeast to continue to resist implementing a saltwater license. Yet, with the exception of Connecticut, whose license bill failed this year, no such license bills exist as far as I know. In my home state, there have been meetings and a lot of talk. But any reasonable draw up of a palatable license proposal gets shot down by a handful of loudmouths in the recreational fishing industry. That’s a huge bummer. So much good could come out of a reasonably drawn up saltwater licensing system. Money, clout, a louder voice etc… And such systems have certainly been drawn up.

Yet, despite all the well-written articles describing the benefits of such a license out there, there are still a lot of false arguments flying around against a saltwater license. E.g. the money will go into the general coffer and not be used for fisheries (even though there is a law in the books of every state that would prevent this, not to mention the federal Wallop Breau audits)… It would kill an already strained recreational fishing industry (yeah right… Look at FL). The list goes on and to cover it all would take more space than I have here.

Aside from all of these fallacies, the simple fact remains that if those non-saltwater-license sates in the Northeast don’t get their act together and implement a license we might as well be throwing that money away, when it could be benefiting those states recreational fisheries greatly. Still, there seems to be no movement, and still, the same folks are voicing the same short-sighted opposition. So, how stupid are we???

Don’t know about you guys, but my fall season was a poor one. There was a noticeable lack of those big fat pig fish that we all dream about. If it wasn’t for those albies I would have called it a bust. Last spring wasn’t so hot either. It’s not just me… There’s a growing chorus of anglers that are concerned about the perceived lack of fish over the 20-pound mark. And the farther North one goes the louder those complaints get. Maine seems to be experiencing the dearth of such fish to a greater extent than other striped bass states. Because Maine is at the northern edge of the species’ range it’s very possible that the state is a bellwether for what may be real problems with the stock. The same case could be made for the saltwater flyfishing/light tackle crowd who, because of the difficulty imposed, may detect a declining trend sooner than those employing more efficient methods.

Yet, despite what appears to be a decline, it is very hard to prove that a scarcity of large fish actually exists. Undoubtedly there are still localized pods of big fish around. Last June, northern New Jersey saw some enormous fish taken by anglers fishing live menhaden. There were also many quality fish taken around a body of menhaden that took up residence off Rhode Island. And no one can claim that there weren’t any big fish in Virginia last winter, as numerous 50-plus pound fish were boated. Still, one would think that a healthy stock composed of a natural age and size structure would show an even distribution of large fish throughout their range.

The latest stock assessment released earlier this year shows that stripers are abundant, capable of producing strong incoming year classes, and are being fished at levels well within the bounds of the current fishery management plan. Unlike species such as summer flounder, the stock is not overfished, and overfishing is not occurring.

However, the stock assessment doesn’t say much about the number of the larger older fish. And here in lies the problem. The “catch at age” models used to determine striped bass abundance are dependent on accurate fish age determination, which is done by counting the rings on a fish’s scale. But this method only works out to about age 11 or 12 because rings on scales stop forming after that. Thus all fish over 11 are lumped together so there is virtually no good age data for striped bass older than 12. The only way to get accurate ages for the older fish is through sectioning otoliths (a bony structure in a fish’s ear). ASMFC is just starting a program to do this, so good data will not be available for several years. Until such data is developed, no one can accurately estimate the true condition of fish older than 12. And judging by what many folks are seeing on the water, including myself, there just aren’t the same number of the big’uns that we had just a few years ago.

It doesn’t take brain surgeon to figure out why this might be happening, just a trip down to any of the big recreational fishing ports on a weekend. When you count the number of carcasses in the trash can then do some coarse math you’ll start to get it. Fish over 30-inches are being harvested at what appears to be an astounding rate. To put it simply, most fish are being killed before they can get big. Thus, the direction we appear to be heading is a stock composed almost exclusively of small fish. Even more gloomy are the mounting studies suggesting we may even be altering the striped bass’ gene pool by killing all those fish that grow fast and grow large, and are most apt to produce a great number of offspring. A kind of reverse natural-selection, so to speak.

And we can’t point the finger at the commercial folks for this one. It’s pretty much exclusively on the angling crowd. Our total harvest dwarfs the commercial one. Believe it or not, just the recreational release mortality alone (those fish the die when we throw them back) is double the total commercial mortality! Maybe hard to swallow, but it appears to be entirely true. And the recreational catch is only growing.

With all this being said, I acknowledge that I may be wrong. Hell, I may just not be the sharpie that folks catching big fish in other regions are. The reality is that I have no solid data to support such assertions regarding the lack of large fish. But the growing number of anglers concerned about their declining striped bass fisheries is getting harder and harder to ignore. And indeed, even the ASMFC’s data shows that fishing mortality is increasing while the spawning stock biomass is decreasing. Regardless the spawning stock biomass is well above the threshold for corrective action and the fishing mortality is well below it so don’t expect to see any corrective action in the near future.

The good news is that while it is still early in the season, I’ve had some really good days with fish in the mid 30” range. So, I’m trying to be optimistic about the whole situation. But I’ll certainly keep an eye on it, so stay tuned. A quick note: I discuss this subject in more detail in my next FFSW resource column. If you are interested in learning more, be sure to take a look when it comes out in the following weeks.

Are economic incentives for conservation the answer?
By Capt John McMurray

Garret Hardin coined the phrase “Tragedy of the Commons” in a 1968 article in the Journal Science. Using the example of common grazing lands in medieval England, Hardin sought to show the destruction that humans impose on publicly-owned resources.

Pointing out that common pastures would inevitably become overgrazed and barren as everyone tried to graze their cattle there, he showed that the “Logic of the Commons” ultimately results in the pasture’s ruin as well as the eventual demise of those who depended upon it for survival. If a thoughtful villager decided to not graze cattle on the commons so that the grass could grow back, other villagers would take advantage of the fact and let their cattle consume the grass. Thus, since the pasture was bound to be ruined, the logical course for a villager was to graze as many cattle on the commons as possible, and take maximum advantage of the grass while it lasted.

The parallel to modern day fisheries is clear, and explains why so many fisheries in the US and elsewhere have been chronically overexploited. Fishermen don’t want to decimate fish stocks, but under today’s system, those who land the most fish reap the greatest benefits, and those who take a more conservative approach merely see the fish that they leave behind caught by someone else. Through subsidies and incentives, the government has allowed too many boats to enter fisheries, so that too many boats are chasing too few fish. As a result, many fishermen can barely make ends meet, placing even more emphasis on short-term benefits.

The 1996 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act attempted to tackle the Tragedy of the Commons by amending management requirements in a few key areas. It limited the allowable catch to maximum sustainable yield (the most fish that can be harvested over the long term without harming the population’s ability to grow back); disallowed economic or social justifications for overfishing; required management plans to define overfishing using objective and measurable criteria and established deadlines for ending overfishing and rebuilding depleted populations. Unfortunately, some fishermen sitting on regional fishery management councils, coupled with a lack of political will, led managers to sidestep such provisions in many cases. Unless it was sued, NOAA Fisheries often did not fulfill its legal responsibility to disapprove plans that allowed overfishing to continue, and develop measures to end overfishing if a council failed to do so. A decade after the 1996 amendments, overfishing still plagued many fisheries.

The Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act (MSRA), which was passed late in 2006 despite aggressive attempts to weaken it, contains a number of provisions designed to remedy shortcomings of the 1996 legislation. However, in the law’s first real test, it failed in its purpose, as NOAA Fisheries allowed a 2008 summer flounder harvest considerably higher than its own scientists recommended because of political pressure from the fishing industry. It was not a good harbinger for the new law.

So what’s the answer? Harden, in his Tragedy of the Commons piece, notes that private pastures right next to the over-grazed and barren commons were in good condition. The owner, who had established a property right over those pastures, had a direct interest in controlling the amount of grazing and imposing controls that would keep the grass healthy and plentiful in the long term. Does it make sense to establish such an ownership system with fisheries resources?

Providing secure access to fisheries is not a new concept. Catch shares — referred to as individual fishing quotas, limited access privilege programs, dedicated access programs etc — assign a certain portion of the available fish to specific individuals or groups of fishermen. If a fisherman holds quota share for 1 percent of a fishery with 1,000 fish, he or she would get 10 fish to catch and sell.

There are no days-at-seas limitations or trip limits with such a system. The fishermen decides when to fish, and determines what proportion of the individual quota should be landed on each voyage. Such a system gives fishermen control over when and how often they go to sea. There is no need to race out during inclement conditions to catch as many fish as possible during a limited season. Fishermen may choose to fish when the market is good, thus maximizing their revenue, reducing seafood market fluctuations and providing more price stability than under the current system. Fisherman can then concentrate on delivering a high-quality product instead of trying to catch as many fish as possible in as short of a time as possible.

More importantly, because they have is a vested interest in the fishery, quota share-holders want the population to grow. If there are 2,000 fish five years from now, that fisherman would get 20 fish to catch and sell. So as the fishery grows, shares become more valuable. Hence, it produces a conservation ethic.
Because quota shares could be sold, they also serve to reduce effort. For some, selling quota might serve as a buyout program. Others might rent their quotas to other vessels, reducing the number of boats on the grounds and so limiting both gear damage to habitat and the number of fish discarded. Depending on how the program is set up, environmental groups might purchase some quotas and leave them dormant in order to reduce fishing in a particular fishery, or angling interests might buy them to provide a larger recreational share.

While quota programs have been enthusiastically adopted in some fisheries, they often meet with strong resistance. Restricting access to what some see as the last frontier is a foreign concept to many who view it as inherently un-American. Some argue that catch-share programs privatize what has historically been a public resource, even though the law is clear that holding quota is a privilege that can be revoked much like a driver’s license. Others claim that such a system can marginalize small fishing operations and reward corporate fishing enterprises. But catch share programs can be designed specifically to address these concerns. For example, cooperatives are emerging as a model in New England for the groundfish fishery. It is also likely to result in some loss of jobs as the industry transitions to a slower, year-round business.

While not perfect, quota-share systems do work. New Zealand, Australia, Iceland and British Columbia run catch-share programs that create higher profits for fishermen, less environmental damage and more sustainable fisheries. Today, there are eight catch-share programs operating in U.S. waters all of which seem to get rave reviews from fishermen and environmentalists.

Last March, Environmental Defense released the first data-driven assessment of U.S. catch-share programs. In the surveyed fisheries, such programs were implemented after failures with traditional management approaches. Overall, the fisheries experienced major economic improvements, clear gains in environmental conditions, and a mixed impact on social conditions. Compliance with total allowable catch increased and bycatch and habitat destruction decreased. There was less job related injury and a higher percentage of fishermen employed. Negative effects included some job losses; private economic gains at public expense; and in some cases increased consolidation. Generally, however, the newer programs addressed these concerns through improved program design.

MSRA establishes comprehensive standards to be followed when regional fishery management councils establish catch share programs. NMFS has yet to produce guidelines on who is eligible for quota and in some cases (e.g., Gulf of Mexico and New England) who can vote in industry referenda for approval of the programs. Another key question is how are the shares of a fishery to be allocated: By traditional individual rights, historical landings or sold to the highest bidder? These are all issues that need to be worked out fair and equitably before any catch-share program can be implemented.

Catch share systems are coming. The New England Fishery Management Council is pushing forward with a program that would allocate shares of the groundfish harvest to the different industry sectors. The South Atlantic council is well on its way to Limited Access Privilege Programs in snapper-grouper fisheries. And the Mid-Atlantic council is developing a IFQ program for tilefish.

Without a doubt, some fishermen are going to be closed out. That’s not good, but the alternative, as three decades of traditional fisheries management has shown, is a Tragedy of the Commons.

The good, the bad, the ugly of live-release contests
By Capt. John McMurray

Historically, sportsmen have been the most effective leaders of the conservation movement. However, our record is far from perfect. From the perspective of conservation, it is difficult to defend the traditional “dead-fish” tournament. At their worst, they encourage anglers to kill overfished species, including sharks and billfish, merely to win a cash prize and transient bragging rights. Even at their best, they promote the retention of large, fecund fish that might better contribute to the spawning stock and subordinate the entire, complex angling experience to a competitor’s standings on the leader board. The sight of dead marlin lying in a dumpster after being weighed in is no less offensive than the fact of commercial overharvest and bycatch, and provides commercial fishers with some justification for continuing their own destructive fishing practices.

Unfortunately, kill tournaments continue to increase in popularity. The American Fisheries Society listed an annual total of 978 such events in 2006. Thus, it’s not just about perception. The negative impacts of tournaments on fishery resources have concerned fishery managers for years.

Decades ago, freshwater tournament organizers realized that kill tournaments benefited no one. They created intricate catch-and-release largemouth-bass and walleye contests with public weigh-ins and release events that advertisers could sponsor. It was brilliant, and today the freshwater tournament circuit is larger and more profitable than its saltwater equivalent.

Slowly and reluctantly, the saltwater community is following suit. Freshwater tournament organizers such as FLW now also put on large saltwater release tournament series. Although such contests are still in the minority, they are a big step forward. However, they are not perfect by. Post- release mortality remains a big issue.

Unlike fish caught by traditional catch and release anglers, those taken in tournaments are subject to considerably more stress, generated by being held in live wells for extended periods, the transport and weigh-in process, the use of fish for photographic opportunities, and tournament release procedures.

Striped Bass

Striped bass tournaments exemplify the problem. Boats that target striped bass rarely have live-wells big enough to adequately accommodate a tournament-winning fish. Furthermore, anglers targeting striped bass frequently fish in rough water that either makes the use of live wells difficult or batters the fish kept within such enclosures. Thus, holding a release tournament for striped bass was not practical. The advent of the “Striper Tube”, while still not yet widely used, has created a new release-tournament option that seems to be catching on.

The device is a vertical 40” tube with an electrical pump at the bottom which circulates sea water over a fish’s gills. It allegedly allows anglers to keep fish alive and healthy for an unlimited amount of time so they can participate in a live weigh-in without killing the fish. The American Fisheries Society has determined the Striper Tube will keep fish alive as claimed, but only in cooler water conditions. Its vertical design appears to calm the fish and reduce its activity, contributing to post-release survival. Hopefully, the availability of such a device will encourage at least some tournament sponsors to adopt a catch and release format.

However, there are also legal issues to consider. “Highgrading,” the release of a smaller fish already in possession in order to replace it with a larger one, is illegal in many states. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation is currently scrutinizing the FLW’s striper release tournament for just that reason, since New York does not permit high-grading for any marine species.

Specs and Redfish Tourneys

While there are many studies of release mortality in marine recreational fisheries and in freshwater tournaments, there is only one study of saltwater tournament-related mortality. Dr. Gregory Stunz of Texas A&M, through a grant from Coastal Conservation Association, recently conducted a study assessing tournament-related mortality of spotted seatrout at 10 live-release fishing tournaments held in Texas.

Combined overall mean mortality was 22.9%. Of that figure, 10.4% of the fish were weighed-in dead, 14.1 percent died in tournament and an additional 1.9% died during a 14-day observation period in laboratory tanks.

Mortality rates were higher during the warmer months, a finding that is consistent with other release mortality studies. Thus, tournament organizers should avoid scheduling events during late spring and summer, in order to maximize survival.

Stunz’s results also suggest that hooking location is a major factor influencing mortality, and that fishing with artificials minimized the number of fish hooked in vulnerable areas. Thus, tournaments interested in reducing mortality should ban the use of bait, or at the very least require participants to use circle-hooks.

While the study suggests that spotted seatrout mortality in live-release tournaments exceeds that observed under normal catch-and-release fishing practices, it also suggests that tournament-related mortality rates are low considering the amount of handling that occurs. This is encouraging for the continued support of live-release fishing tournaments, and not just for specs. “While this paper was on spotted seatrout,” notes Stunz, “I would think red drum would have even lower mortality.” Stunz is currently looking for funding to complete a similar study for red drum.

Billfish Release Tournaments

There are no tournament-specific mortality studies for big game fish. Many scientists feel that recreational fishing is recreational fishing, regardless of whether or not it is conducted during a tournament. However, this may not be the case. During release-tournaments, the idea is to get the fish hooked, to the boat, and released for points as quickly as possible so that the boat can move on to the next fish. “The fish is angled and handled quickly, thereby minimizing stress and reducing release mortality.” notes Dr. Greg Skomal who has done extensive work on pelagic fish release mortality. “During kill tournaments, which typically have self-imposed and federally mandated high minimum sizes, time is taken to measure the fish at the boat, thereby increasing handling time and physiological/physical trauma that may result in mortality if/when the fish is released.”

The required use of circle hooks in offshore release-tournaments would greatly reduce release mortality for pelagic fish. NMFS planned to put such a rule into effect this year, but withdrew the proposal for a period of one year, at the urging of s handful of tournament organizers,, despite studies indicating that the use of non-offset circle hooks, instead of J-hooks, would reduce post-release mortality of white marlin by as much as 66 percent, which could translate into about 500 additional fish surviving each year. Given the dire condition of the white marlin population and lawsuits brought by conservation groups seeking to compel NMFS to recommend listing white marlin under the Endangered Species Act, the tournament organizers’ opposition to circle hooks is puzzling, since the additional 500 marlin killed by J-hooks this year strengthens the litigants’ arguments, and threatens the end of all offshore tournament fishing

Conclusion:

Dead fish displayed to the public during kill-tournament weigh-ins harm the credibility of anglers who argue for needed fisheries conservation measures. While one can argue that all tournaments cause some harm, catch-and-release tournaments are certainly a better alternative than those requiring that fish be killed. Saltwater anglers may finally be embracing such events. Although commercial fishers and PETA types love to wail and moan about release-mortality, with care such mortality can be kept within acceptable levels. That’s good news for the fish and for the anglers that target them. Hopefully we will see more release events tournaments in the near future.

Originally published in Flyfishing in Saltwaters Magazine: Nov/Dec 2007

The tragic decline in the credibility of the angling community as a conservation force.
By Capt. John McMurray

At one time, anglers were proudly at the forefront of the marine conservation movement, calling on regulators to cut landings and impose more restrictions on all users, including anglers, for the betterment of our fish populations. Anglers’ passionate efforts to rebuild the striped bass population in the 1980s and ‘90s, including wide support for a harvest moratorium, represent just one shining example of that conservation legacy. However, in recent years, that all seems to have changed.

The problem seems most acute in the upper mid-Atlantic region where I reside. There, a small but very vocal minority has somehow managed to hijack many of the local outdoor publications. Their intemperate rants, which sound like nothing so much as the self-serving rhetoric of the New England commercial fishing community, makes it appear as if the recreational fishing community has abandoned a conservation ethic and adopted the “we-need-to-kill-more-fish-and-to-hell-with-the-future” mantra that was (and still is) all too commonly heard repeated on fish docks anywhere from Brielle to Gloucester to Portland.

It’s easy to understand why such sentiments arise. People who make their living by putting a price on the head of a fish see more restrictive regulations and other conservation efforts as immediate and direct threats to their livelihood. Concerned with paying for this month’s dockage and next week’s groceries, they concentrate on short-term profits and are nearly blind to the long-term benefits of science-based fisheries management. Thus, fisheries managers must rise to the challenge of making difficult decisions that focus on the long term, knowing that such a “tough love” approach is best for fish and fishermen alike.

I find it extremely disturbing that a contingent of the fishing community has now gone so far as to partner with the commercial fishing community, and continues to mount a concerted effort to tear the most important conservation provisions out of the Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation Act, which was reauthorized after much work a bit more than a year ago. Using bullying tactics that seem calculated to intimidate and stigmatize anyone who opposes them, they label conservationists, including conservation-minded anglers, as “elitists,” “environmental radicals” and “extremists” trying to “take food off the table,” “putting good folks out of business” etc. While that is simply not true, it has had the effect of making many anglers suspicious of biologists, fisheries managers and conservation efforts generally, and creating a “real men kill fish” attitude among the less knowledgeable members of the angling community. Readers need only look at previous fishery management success stories, including striped bass, haddock and red drum, to understand how important angler-supported conservation efforts are to the health of our fisheries, and to realize how the current anti-conservation message being spewed from some media outlets threatens the long-term prospects of the nation’s marine resources.

Hiding behind the euphemism “flexibility”, commercial fishermen and their allies in the recreational community call for the extension or removal of rebuilding deadlines for species such as summer flounder, grouper and red snapper. Years ago, we heard New England groundfishermen voice similar cries as they devastated stocks of fish that had previously supported not only North Americans, but most of coastal Europe, for more than five centuries. It is sad that some who purport to represent anglers would take us back to the days when too much emphasis on short-term economic well-being led to the collapse of not only our northeastern fisheries, but a traditional way of life in the region. Now, despite a decade of tougher management, cod populations are still a shadow of what they were, and there are serious doubts that some species, such as winter flounder, will ever come back. The commercial fishing industry’s short-term mindset has brought great hardship to commercial fishermen; I now fear that anglers have also lost their long-term perspective, and in adopting the attitudes of the commercial fishery, will suffer the same awful fate.

Editorial dishonesty is adding to the problem. Too many publications and too many columnists prejudice their readers against scientific fisheries management, throwing around emotion-laden catch phrases such as “Arbitrary rebuilding deadlines”, “pie in the sky targets” and other such catch phrases, in an effort to make scientists and conservationists look like fools. (My favorite nonsense headline came from a New Jersey paper which announced “Fluke Anglers Take On Experts Blinded by Science”, suggesting that knowledge and technical expertise is antithetical to proper fisheries management, and that ignorance is, in fact, bliss. These folks don’t have a leg to stand on when confronted with the science, but since they never print both sides of a story, they give their readers no opportunity to form an educated opinion about fisheries issues—which is what they want, because education is the greatest threat to their position.

There is a very real battle underway for the soul of the angling community, pitting those who are fighting to kill more fish now, and perhaps never fully restoring our fisheries, against folks who have taken a longer view and support precautionary measures to ensure there are abundant stocks of fish around for the next generation.

I know where I stand. The question is, who’s doing the “right” thing here, and which side are you on?

How your tax dollars contribute to overfishing
By Capt. John McMurray

Paying taxes is certainly not something we take any pleasure in doing, but Franklin D. Roosevelt correctly noted “Taxes, after all, are dues that we pay for the privileges of membership in an organized society.” The underlying assumption to Roosevelt’s comments were that such “dues” would be used to advance the public interest. In the case of our overstressed marine fisheries, that has not always been the case.

For at least the past 50 years, one of the problems that has bedeviled fishery managers is “overcapacity,” which can be described simply as “too many fishermen chasing too few fish.” Unfortunately, while one branch of government is trying to solve such problems, another perpetuates them through subsidies and incentive programs that defy market forces as well as the dictates of nature which would have otherwise rationalized in an economically unsustainable commercial fishing industry. As a result of such government intervention, the industry has continued to overfish many historically and biologically significant fish stocks. And, it is the public’s tax dollars that are supporting such destruction of public resources.

One example is the Fisheries Financing Program, which grew out of the Fisheries Loan Fund in the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956. Under that plan, the federal government guarantees loans made to fishing vessel owners, fish processors and other fishing-related businesses. In return, banks work with the government to offer fishermen loans with longer amortization periods and very low interest rates. Although the lending bank is a private entity, NOAA Fisheries play a major role, processing the loan applications and often introduce fishermen to a potential lender. Most such loans have financed the construction, replacement, and/or upgrading of commercial vessels thus helping to create a large fleet of increasingly advanced fishing vessels that continue to wreak havoc on fish and fish habitat.

While recent regulations prohibit any financing or refinancing that could contribute to overcapitalization by increasing harvesting capacity, such regulations can’t undo the harm that the program has caused by overcapitalizing the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery, the New England groundfish fishery and the U.S. Pacific tuna fishery, all of which are now suffering the effects of depleted stocks and increased regulation.

The Capital Construction Fund (CCF) created by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, may be an even more harmful incentive program, and one without even minimal safeguards against overcapitalization. CCF was conceived after the passage of the Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act in the late 1970s, when it was thought that U.S. fishermen would enjoy substantial increases in landings once foreign fishermen were excluded from US waters, and reflected a Federal policy of encouraging the expansion and modernizing of the U.S. fishing fleet.

CCF, which is jointly administered by NOAA Fisheries and the Internal Revenue Service, allows fishermen to defer income tax on profits from fishing by setting such money aside in a special account for the eventual construction, upgrading or acquisition of fishing vessels. The amount deferred is, in effect, an interest free vessel construction loan from the Government. Just like the Fisheries Financing Program, CCF has had the effect of increasing the number, size, range and efficiency of commercial fishing vessels, so they can go out farther and more effectively exploit declining stocks.

Besides providing direct financial aid, the Federal Government has a long-standing record of providing free marketing, promotion, and development assistance to the nation’s fisheries, even those that are exploiting stocks in serious decline. NOAA Fisheries has also played a key role in fishing gear technology development and seafood processing technology, thus helping fishers become more efficient.

NOAA Fisheries has also advocated the development of fisheries for so-called “underutilized species”, providing incentives and subsidies for promotion, marketing and, in some cases vessel refitting. A number of instances exist in which government incentives to expand underutilized fisheries have led to quick overcapacity and overfishing of the target species. The tragic collapse of several Atlantic shark species provides what may be the best example.

Federal “Fishery Disaster Assistance” authorized under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act has also proven problematic. Such assistance might be appropriate in the case of natural disasters, such as hurricanes and other severe coastal storms. It also might be appropriate when fisheries collapse due to human activity unrelated to fishing, such as the sharp decline in Pacific salmon populations after the damming of rivers in the Pacific Northwest cut off the fish’s access to productive spawning habitat. Even in the case of natural and man-made “disasters”, it is not clear that using federal funding to restore the status quo is a better long-term policy than using the same funds to implement capacity reduction through buyouts or other means.

However, we witness a clear abuse of Fishery Disaster Assistance funding when federal money is used to bail out commercial fishing fleets that have brought the so-called “disaster” upon themselves through pure greed and lack of foresight, and fished stocks down to the point of collapse. In 1995, a thirty million dollar handout of that sort was provided to New England commercial fishermen to help them through the self-inflicted “crisis” caused by the depletion of cod and other groundfish. Today, cod and other groundfish stocks are still in bad shape and the fishing industry remains a basket case. It is very likely that both the fish and the fishing industry would have been far healthier if market forces had been allowed to rationalize the fleet and force the large number of marginally profitable operators out of the fishery.

Today, history seems poised to repeat itself. The Governor of Massachusetts has requested Federal Disaster Assistance for commercial fishermen in his state, claiming that recent regulations, intended to help recover groundfish stocks from decades of overfishing, have caused “a true economic disaster.” He is basically asking the public to insulate New England fishermen from the predictable consequences of their own actions, and to pick up the tab for years of avoidable overfishing. Some argue that the commercial fleets were only following federal rules when they plundered groundfish stocks, ignoring the fact that the commercial fishing industry’s lobbyists relentlessly and, until recently, successfully pushed for federal rules that allowed overfishing to continue. It is absurd to even consider using pubic tax money to again save the commercial fishing industry from its own folly, and naïve to believe that, should such bailout take place, the fishermen wouldn’t immediately seek regulations that would allow them to continue to overfish groundfish.

Not all federal subsidies are bad. Programs that buy back vessels, permits or quota shares provide an economic incentive for fishermen to leave the industry should receive a larger share of federal fisheries assistance funding. Such programs were not effective in the past, because they did not give adequate consideration to “latent capacity.” Vessels owners would sell back a vessel or particular permits, then merely concentrate their fishing effort on other fisheries not included in the program. Other fishers who. although permitted, were not active participants in a fishery, will take advantage of their previously unused permits to enter the fishery and fill the void left by those that are bought out. Fishermen can also alter their behavior when they know that a buyout program is being considered, staying in a fishery longer than they otherwise would have, hoping that the buyout will bring a financial windfall. However, good buyout programs can be designed to minimize such occurrences. Some buyback efforts, including effirts financed by the fishing industry, are currently under way.

Subsidies for job retraining, which permits the economic diversification of previously fishing-dependent communities, are also a productive use of federal money. Programs for non-fishing economic development can assist displaced workers find other jobs and identify new economic enterprises in such communities. Finally, it is difficult to argue against using federal funding for research and development of bycatch reduction devices and habitat-friendly gear.

Thus, federal fisheries assistance funding is not inherently bad, but merely misdirected. The federal government should stop providing economic incentives for economically marginal businesses to remain active in a fishery, when market forces and a scarcity of fish dictate otherwise. Congress should end support for the construction and refitting of vessels, and permit banks to base their lending decisions on the viability of the borrower’s business. Dollars previously allocated to such programs should be redirected toward efforts that will end overcapitalization, reduce bycatch and improve gear selectivity. Using taxpayer dollars in an attempt to keep economically moribund businesses on life support is a breach of the public trust and the worst kind of pork barrel spending.

On May 5, 2007, a bipartisan group of 13 United States Senators introduced a resolution calling for the U.S. to pursue an international ban on government subsidies that contribute to overfishing. As egregious as some U.S. programs are, this nation provides far fewer such subsidies than does Japan, the European Union or China. The Senate resolution inherently recognizes that fact, but the Senate should also look inward and propose a national ban on destructive subsidies as well. However, such a measure would not be popular in many coastal states, and we are not likely to see such a proposal made in the foreseeable future.

A prior version of this piece appeared in FFSW Magazine

By Capt. John McMurray

Unless you failed out of school by junior high, you are familiar with “evolution” and Darwin’s Theory of Natural Selection. If you are not, it can be summarized quite simply: “the fit survive.” In the natural world predators pick off the weak, the young and the infirm, leaving the fastest-growing, strongest, and biggest of the species to contribute to the gene pool. But, today’s methods of fishery management, particularly those used in many recreational fisheries, may be turning the natural selection process 180-degrees.

Instead of weeding out the weak from the herd, well-intentioned fisheries managers trying to manage fish through size limits have directed a great majority of the fishing pressure and subsequent mortality on the biggest, oldest fish that are most fit for survival. Call it “unnatural selection” if you will, and the top predators (us fishermen) are the ones doing the selecting.

Dr. David Conover, head of Marine Sciences Research Center at Stony Brook University, NY published some interesting findings in that regard. Through his work with Atlantic silversides (a small bait fish in the mid-Atlantic and northeast) he was able to provide the first evidence that the growth rates of fish and the productivity of populations can evolve rapidly in response to size-selective harvest.

Conover’s work was based on three populations of 1000 Atlantic silversides raised in identical, but separate environments. Ninety percent of the fish from each group were harvested according to size. In one population he removed the smallest 900, in the second he removed the largest 900, in the third, he removed a random 900. The remaining fish in each controlled setting were allowed to reproduce.

After four generations, the average weight of the largest fish in the population from which the largest fish were removed was 1.05 grams, compared to 3.17 grams in the random-selection tank and 6.47 grams in the tank from which only the smallest fish were removed. The survivors of the group from which only the largest fish were taken show very obvious reductions in average size and total weight. Furthermore, the number of survivors in the group from which only small fish were taken was double that of the population from which only large fish were harvested.

Thus, it appears taking only the biggest fish from a population may cause that population to produce smaller and fewer fish in the future. It may also concentrate genetic growth traits. Because traditional minimum size limits concentrate harvest on larger individuals, fish have a low probability of making it to spawning age, and of surviving once they get there. Thus, evolutionary adaptation may favor fish that spawn younger.

If that is true, anglers will be looking at future sportfish populations comprised almost entirely of “runts,” containing very few if any “trophies.” We may already be seeing this trend. In my neck of the woods, there seems to be fewer large stripers, yet an abundance of small fish. In 1940 the average cod brought to the dock in New England was 36 inches long. Today they average about 24 inches, a decline of one-third. The big cod are for practical purposes, gone. There is also data showing that cod are now maturing at much smaller sizes than was previously the case. Pelagic species are showing the same trend. There is some evidence suggesting that that eastern-stock bluefin tuna mature far earlier, and at smaller sizes, than western-stock bluefin, perhaps as a result of thousands of years of natural selection in the face of traditional Mediterranean fisheries.

A lack of large fish, and the loss of a natural distribution of age and size classes within a fish population, has important implications for long-term stock productivity and stability. Dr. Conover’s studies revealed that removal of the large individual silversides from the population resulted in the production of smaller egges and larvae. Such decline in larvae size was accompanied by a decline in swimming strength and feeding rates. The smaller larvae were also less able to convert food to body mass, and less willing to forage for food. It took only five generations for such changes to occur.

Smaller fish produce fewer offspring, which are less able to survive. A lack of variability in the small-fish gene-pool also renders such fish less able to withstand environmental challenges, such as periodic spawning failure or, disease. A spawning stock comprised of many age classes is more stable, and the better able to withstand the extraordinary events in the ecosystem which occur from time to time.

If minimum size limits are not the answer, how should we to manage sportfish? The obvious answer is to implement slot limits, allowing folks to keep a fish that falls within certain size parameters. This is already done with a number of species in a number of states. But it does not work with every species.

A slot limit can have an undesirable effect by focusing the pressure on a weak year that can’t tolerate the concentrated fishing effort. In popular fisheries such as striped bass there is a risk of severely depleting a weak year class that happens to fall within a slot limit’s bounds. The right way to use a slot limit is to reset it annually, tailoring the limits to the needs of the stock, by concentrating harvest on those year classes most able to tolerate the pressure and directing it away from the most vulnerable year classes. For instance, one year the slot limit might be 28 to 36”. The next year it might be 24” to 28,” to take advantage of a younger, very abundant cohort. However no such system exists today.

In species with long adult lives and low susceptibility to release mortality, the key factor may be “escapement” - setting a maximum size to assure that sufficient large fish survive to constitute a healthy spawning stock. Generally, the best course of action may also be to keep fishing mortality low enough to allow a more natural age and size structure in the population. Emphasis should be placed on a size limit that permits the majority–ideally 100%–of the fish in the population to spawn prior to being harvested. That would require fishing at a rate well below Maximum Sustainable Yield (the most fish that can be taken out of the population while maintaining long-term sustainability) and at higher minimum size limits.

Unfortunately, the politics of fisheries management have historically prevented such a management approach. Many fishing industry spokesmen argue that we have to kill as many fish as possible. Any time that knowledgeable and responsible folks even suggest reducing mortality and raising size limits, they are immediately labeled “elitists” that “don’t care about the common man being able to take a fish home for his family” and subsequently get trashed by the angling press. Unfortunately there may not be any fish worth taking home unless managers stand up and take notice of Conover’s work as it relates to the declining size trends in many local fisheries.

BEACH REPLENISHMENT OR BEACH DESTRUCTION?
Why the Army Core of Engineers Sucks.
By Captain John McMurray

The Army Corps of Engineers is one of the largest government agencies in the US, dwarfing behemoths such as the departments of Labor, Education, and Energy. While a third of the bureaucracy work on military programs the rest focus on civil works which unsuccessfully seek to control forces of nature. Arrogantly, the Corps has moved forward with ditching, draining, straightening and damming efforts that have been destructive to fish and fish habit in almost every state. In addition to being one of the largest bureaucracies, they are also one of most effective at generating congressionally supported pork-barrel projects to keep it busy. That’s why it didn’t surprise me when I heard about the ill-conceived plan to “re-nourish” (a fancy word for dredge and fill) my home-town beach in Long Beach, New York. If it goes though, I can kiss the fishing here goodbye. Unfortunately, this egregious project is only the tip of the iceberg. Because of the hysteria brought on by prior years’ hurricane seasons, the array of large-scale beach dredge-and-fill projects currently being considered constitute a real and significant threat to “Essential Fish Habitat” and near-shore fishing opportunities in every coastal state.

Most estimates indicate that approximately 80% of the U.S. shoreline is eroding. While this fact is somewhat disturbing, it shouldn’t be. Since the beginning, beaches have been changing their location but retaining their general shape. The conflict arises when shoreline retreat meets human obstacles, such as houses, highways, and seawalls. Dr. Orrin Pilkey, renowned Duke University professor and author of The Corps and The Shore said it best, “Erosion isn’t a problem for beaches, just for buildings.” These structures block the retreat causing the sandy area to narrow which leads to a reduction in sand supply to adjacent beaches. Beaches get narrower and can eventually wash away, eliminating the buffer between the open-ocean and coastal properties.

Environmental Damage:

The idea behind the Corps’ dredge-and-fill solution to this problem is to strip-mine sand in offshore locations with industrial dredges and dump it on what they determined to be eroding beaches. While this may sound harmless, these projects inevitably destroy important marine habitats in off-shore grounds, and then further wreak havoc on the ecosystem when dumping sand on beaches. Almost all seafloor-dwelling marine life occurs in that 6-inch margin of surface. Offloading fill on beaches smothers tidal wildlife. Hundreds of species of crustaceans, mollusks, and annelids that form the prey base for important sportfish are killed or have to move to another location.

The filling eventually covers important near-shore reefs that hold important juvenile as well as adult populations of sportfish and the bait they depend on. There have been some mitigation efforts with artificial reefs, but they don’t work in the way natural reefs do as they don’t generate same food sources, plus they are placed in water too deep to provide the shallow structure required for juvenile fishes. After decades of negligent dredge and fill projects, the law now requires buffer areas between the dredge sites and reefs, which are federally designated as Essential Fish Habitat and/or Habitat Areas of Particular Concern. But, there are no consistent standards, and as sand supplies shrink, regulators will likely face pressure to decrease buffer distances. Regardless, the current buffer requirement isn’t sufficient because the sediments migrate anyway, eventually burying these reefs.

In many instances the Corps doesn’t dump beach quality sand back onto the beach because this type of sentiment is in short supply. Beach invertebrate expert and professor of the University of North Carolina Institute of Marine Sciences Dr. Pete Peterson notes: “It’s like going out into your backyard and loading five feet of dirt onto the grass. Not much is going to survive. The recovery you get will depend on whether you put the same sort of dirt on your lawn.” The particles used are either too big or small in most cases. In some instances, the Corps has used small particles geologists would call silts and clays or what we would call mud. Not only does it erode easily and quickly, but it becomes suspended creating a situation where some organisms suffocate the turbid water. Of course, the murky water rules out any sight-fishing opportunities, but even worse it inhibits feeding as many fish are visual feeders, including red drum, snook, jacks, permit, bluefish, mackerel, stripers, bonito, and flounders. Furthermore, many of the larval and bait fishes are filter feeders and they end up being forced to filter out mud along with the plankton they are targeting which most likely kills a lot of them. Unfortunately, the murky water exists not just in the site where the beach fill takes place. The turbidity extends down the beach for miles, disturbing habitats well beyond the site zone.

The small particle fill that remains on the bottom becomes compacted, creating a situation where it is very difficult for digging beach organisms like mole crabs and worms to burrow. These animals simply get washed off the face of the beach. Dozens of studies have shown significant impacts to beach invertebrate populations.

When the corps uses large particles the result is just as horrific. Beach organisms simply get buried. Even if the Corps manages to find similar sized sand the result is still unsatisfactory. Dr. Hal Wanless, Chairman of Geological Sciences at the University of Miami’s Rosenstiel School notes, “The sediments mined offshore either ‘grew’ there or migrated there because they’re too fine to stay on the beach. Even when the grains are roughly the same size as the polished quartz beach sediments, they won’t behave the same in the surf zone.”

Because the Corps very rarely documents the environmental impacts of these projects, the cumulative effects on the coastal resources are not well documented. Experts estimate that Corps beach projects have created scores of large dredge craters among mid-shelf reef habitat and buried thousands of acres of near-shore reefs and sea-grass beds, not to mention altered migration patterns of most beach accessible sportfish. Add to this the possible exacerbation of transport and/or biological uptake of toxicants and other pollutants released at either dredge or fill sites and one begins to get a picture of how bad these projects really are for the ocean environment and the fishing.

The near-shore environment effected by these projects is so important to so many juvenile gamefish and forage species that cumulatively the habitat loss and diminishment of forage effect fishing not just off the beach, but everywhere else you can expect to find your favorite sportfish.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) mandates detailed assessments for all federal projects that can have significant environmental impacts. Unfortunately, NEPA gives the authority to do these assessments to the Army Corps of Engineers, the agency that is typically the project proponent. Impact statements continuously assume the effects are minimal or do not exist. The dredge and fill lobby maintains that whatever effect the projects are having are only temporary. But the fact of the matter is that most of these projects require continued “re-nourishment,” so even if the beach critters do recover they will be covered again.

Effectiveness:

Everyone agrees that beach replenishment is only a temporary solution as the fill just gets washed back to sea. According to Pilkey “26 percent of replenished U.S. Atlantic Coast barrier beaches (from the south shore of Long Island to Miami) were effectively gone in less than one year, while 62 percent lasted between two and five years, and 12 percent (all in southeast Florida) lasted more than five years.” Filled beaches erode two to twelve times faster than native beaches. Shoreline engineering ultimately weakens the beaches, and coastal geologists have warned that interfering with natural beach processes may actually increase the risk of flooding.

Development:

Despite beach erosion problems and the fact that development accelerates damage to the beach, almost every state on the east coast continues to allow new development and rebuilding right up to the fore-dune. Federal Emergency Management insurance has allowed home and hotel owners to recoup losses after weather events and to be provided with sand at taxpayers’ expense so they can rebuild in the exact same place further compounding the erosion. Continued dredge and filling of beaches will further open the way for new waves of building on private property that is now un-developable.

There are more sensible models for development. When Hurricane Opal hit the Florida panhandle in 1995, towns like Destin and Dune-Allen were devastated, but the town of Seaside — a recently constructed village of 280 old-Florida-style frame homes set back behind the dunes — came out unscathed.

Inappropriate Tax expenditure:

The watchdog organization Taxpayers for Common Sense claims that federal beach dredge and fill projects are merely a subsidy for wealthy beach communities benefiting only those who can afford property along coast, arguing that taxpayers wind up paying to protect private property. This is particularly noteworthy, considering the fact that many of the filled beaches offer very little parking/public access.

Solutions:

Environmental groups have proposed an alternative to dredge and fill projects called “Planned Retreat.” They are suggesting that the government begin to buy up threatened properties and return them to a pre-developed condition. Dredge and fill proponents say this would cost billions of dollars and send coastal real estate values plummeting. But given the massive reoccurring expenditures involved in beach filling, this alternative would be cheaper and in the interest of the general public and beach visitors rather than the few wealthy coastal property owners. Of course, the political will necessary to do that is not there yet because, yes, it does seem a bit on the extreme side. But, cutting taxes and buying threatened properties out when erosion reaches their foundations does make sense. That obviously can’t happen in places populated with all high rises. Dredge and fill projects will undoubtedly continue there. In these instances Environmental Groups are asking that the Corps do these projects in ways that aren’t so harmful to near-shore habitat and to not proceed with giant, squared off, massive beaches that extend a quarter mile off shore where they are burying everything in sight every five to seven years. Right now, that’s the standard template in almost all off the East Coast.

Conclusion:

The Corps of Engineers is at a crossroads. The 19th-Century thinking that they can ditch, drain, straighten, dam, levee, control and defy Mother Nature is changing. In 1990, “environmental restoration” joined flood control and navigation as a primary mission of the Corps’. The agency should consider this mission here and reevaluate the long-term costs of all these projects. Furthermore, policies should be put in place to discourage hazardous coastal development that threatens the environment and commits government to doing little more than throwing buckets of money to hold back the ocean.

The Surfrider Foundation is leading the charge to ensure these dredge and fill projects are not carried out unless absolutely necessary and if so, that they are done so in a less destructive manner. For more information, check out their website at www.surfrider.com and click on your local chapter’s link.

Originally published in Flyfishing in Saltwaters